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Immigrant Assimilation, Trust and Social Capital
* 
 
Trust is a crucial component of social capital. We use an experimental moonlighting game 
with a representative sample of the U.S. population, oversampling immigrants, to study trust, 
positive, and negative reciprocity between first-generation immigrants and native-born 
Americans as a measure of immigrant assimilation. We also survey subjects in order to relate 
trusting and trustworthy behavior with demographic characteristics and traditional, survey-
based measures of social capital. We find that immigrants are as trusting as native-born U.S. 
citizens when faced with another native-born citizen, but do not trust other immigrants. 
Immigrants appear to be less trustworthy overall but this finding disappears when we control 
for demographic variables and the amount sent by the first mover. The length of time an 
immigrant has been a naturalized U.S. citizen appears to increase trustworthiness but does 
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The problem of un-assimilated immigrants is broadly acknowledged as a root
cause of terrorism and a serious national security concern. Unemployment,
discontent, and alienation from broader society in immigrant ghettos across
Western Europe and the UK turn them into potential breeding grounds for
fundamentalism and extremism. (Roy, 2004).
Beyond speaking the language and adopting the traditions of one's adopted
country, social capital can be a vital measure of the assimilation process.
Putnam (2000) describes two kinds of social capital { bonding capital, which
refers to the closeness of links within a community, and bridging capital,
which refers to the links between communities. Immigrant communities
have some amount of both, but the amount of bridging capital between
immigrants and native communities can be an indicator of how well as-
similated the immigrant community is. Trust and trustworthiness are key
components of social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman, and Soutter, 2000), and therefore the levels of trust and trust-
worthiness within a community, and between people of dierent communi-
ties, can serve as useful indicators of the social capital accumulated. At
the same time, lack of trust and the presence of actively negative feelings
can serve as useful measures of the levels of discontent and alienation that
communities may or may not feel.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relative levels of bridging
and bonding capital between rst-generation immigrants and native-born
Americans at an individual level, and compare this with among immigrant
communities. We use experimental methods to study trust, positive, and
negative reciprocity. We combine the experiment with a survey to more
precisely learn what develops the two forms of social capital. We can relate
it to demographic characteristics, income, education, and life experiences,
which may be shaped by exclusionary attitudes of the native population, as
studied in Australia by Louis, Duck, Terry, Schuller, and Lalonde (2007), or
by competitive versus cooperative experiences (Johnson, Johnson, Tiany,
and Zaidman, 1984). Since the study was conducted using a Knowledge
Networks panel, the respondents are a representative sample of the U.S.
population, with immigrants oversampled.
The moonlighting game, developed by Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner
(2000), is an eective way to measure trust, reciprocity, and trustworthi-
ness. For our purposes, it is superior to an ordinary trust or investment
game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman,
and Soutter, 2000; Carter and Castillo, 2002). It constrains the action set
2less, since subjects can send both positive and negative amounts, potentially
taking money from the person they are paired with or punishing. This allows
for the testing of trust and positive reciprocity as well as negative feelings
and the fear of negative reciprocity. It also more closely mirrors the experi-
ence for illegal immigrants, who are especially susceptible to \punishment."
2 Experiment Setup
The setup of the game is as follows: Each individual is randomly assigned
to being either a rst mover or a second mover. Both rst and second
movers are credited with a money endowment of 10 dollars. Each rst
mover is given the task of deciding whether she wants to give to a randomly
paired second mover none, some, or all of her endowment or take up to $5
from the paired person. Any amounts given by the rst mover are tripled
by the experimenter, while any amounts taken by the rst mover are not
transformed. The second mover then decides how much to return to the
rst mover, and can also punish the rst mover. Each dollar that the second
mover gives to the paired rst mover costs the second mover 1 dollar . Each
three dollars that the second mover takes from the paired rst mover costs
the second mover one dollar, so that punishment is costly. The second
mover's choices are constrained so as not to give either a negative payo.
All choices are required to be in integer amounts.
Respondents completed their questionnaires online at their convenience,
and were randomly matched ex-post. Due to the nature of the survey, the
strategy method (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2000) is the only feasible way
to elicit responses from the second mover. This has the added advantage
of providing a full range of information on the second mover's responses to
each possible decision by the rst mover. Each second mover decides, for
each possible action of the rst mover, whether she wants to give money to
the paired rst mover or take money from her.
The amount sent by the rst mover is tripled so that joint prots, and
welfare, are clearly maximized when there is a great degree of trust, leading
to the entire amount being sent in anticipation of a \fair split" by the second
mover. Following Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), beliefs about the behavior
of the average person were elicited from both the rst and the second mover,
with a monetary reward for guessing correctly. Gaechter and Renner (2006)
show that incentivized beliefs are more accurate than beliefs that are elicited
without a monetary incentive. First movers were asked to guess the behavior
of the average second mover, and second movers were asked to guess the
3behavior of the average rst mover. This enables us to understand their
motivations, and to distinguish between trust in anticipation of reciprocity
(or reciprocity in response to trust) versus altruism { do people only send
high amounts if they expect to have a signicant portion of it returned (or
if a large amount was sent to them)?
There are four types of pairings. Using I to represent an immigrant of
one's own community, N to represent a US native, FM to represent the rst
mover and SM to represent the second mover, the pairings are: I (FM) -
I (SM), I (FM) - N (SM), N (FM) - I (SM), and N (FM) - N (SM). The
pairings were arranged using the respondents' place of birth, which had
been collected by Knowledge Networks previously. Subjects were randomly
assigned to rst mover or second mover status and treatments.
Subjects were informed of the region of origin of the person they were
going to be matched with. The actual matching of responses was accord-
ingly conducted ex-post, once all the surveys were completed. For example,
a respondent listing their (or their parents) place of birth as Jordan was pre-
assigned to the I (FM) - I (SM) treatment and informed that they will be
matched with another randomly selected individual from the Middle East,
living in the US. If they were assigned to the I (FM) - N (SM) or the N
(FM) - I (SM) treatment, they were informed that they would be matched
with a randomly selected American. A respondent listing their and their
parents' place of birth as the US was informed that they will be matched
with a randomly selected immigrant to the US if they were assigned to the
I (FM) - N (SM) or N (FM) - I (SM) treatment, or with a randomly se-
lected American if they were assigned to the N (FM) - N (SM) treatment.
Immigrants from any particular region will be matched only with others
from their own region in the I (FM) - I (SM) treatment. While interactions
between dierent immigrant groups are an important topic of study, they
are beyond the scope of this paper. Information about respondents' religion
was not used to match subjects.
The survey included questions on whether the subject or anyone they
know has ever been a victim of a hate crime or prejudice, to see whether these
experiences made a person more or less likely to trust, take money or punish.
It therefore provided a chance to see not just whether or not people punish
or take money, but who did so, with respect to income, background, and life
experiences. Data on income and educational background are collected in
the standard set of demographic questions that preceded the survey. We also
included selected core questions from the World Bank's questionnaire on so-
cial capital (Grootaert, Narayan, Jones, and Woolcock, 2004) to test if these
measures of social capital serve as predictors of trusting and reciprocal be-
4havior versus punishment or taking money. The experiment was conducted
online by Knowledge Networks. The subjects were a random sample of the
United States population, and immigrants were oversampled. Subjects were
existing members of the Knowledge Networks panel, who had been given
the hardware required to complete surveys online using their TV sets. They
were all paid based on the outcomes of the moonlighting game. There was
no separate participation fee since all panelists are already compensated by
Knowledge Networks for being on the panel.
3 Hypotheses
We separately identify the dierences in trusting behavior within immigrant
and native communities, as measured by the I (FM) - I (SM) and N (FM)
- N (SM) treatments, and between immigrant and native communities, as
measured by the I (FM) - N (SM) and N (FM) - I (SM) treatments.
We identify the demographic and other characteristics that make immi-
grants more or less likely to trust, take money, or punish. We expect that
people with more bridging social capital will be more trusting of an individ-
ual from the \other" group, whether native or immigrant, than people with
less bridging social capital. We test the following hypotheses:
H1: People will have more bonding social capital within their \own"
community, whether immigrant or native-born American, than bridging so-
cial capital with those in the \other" community. Meaning, they will be
more likely to trust someone in their \own" community by giving them
money rather than taking money from them. They will be relatively less
likely to give money to someone from the \other" community, and more
likely to take money from them.
H2: People with more social capital as indicated by the survey will have
higher incomes and human capital and will also show more trusting and
less negative behavior. They will be more likely to give money than take,
regardless of whom they are paired with.
In sum, we wish to identify the relative importance of individual human
capital vis- a-vis positive (or negative) experiences in the adopted country
on the development of bridging and bonding capital and the assimilation
process. We aim to further the understanding of immigrant assimilation
and behavior, potentially aiding the design of immigration policy. This
issue is crucial to the study of migration and immigrant communities, and
for the long-term success of the American \melting pot."
54 Results
Subjects were randomly assigned to treatment { see Table 1 and Table 2.
Tables 4 and 5, along with gures 1 and 2 show the the amounts sent by rst
and second movers in the various treatments. Figure 5 shows the average
amount sent by second movers in each treatment in response to the amount
sent by the rst mover. Interestingly, while there are some outliers, the
averages show that the typical person merely attempts to reduce the rst
mover's payo by approximately the amount that was taken away from
them, not more. Figures 6 and 7 show us how much rst movers send relative
to expected responses by the second mover, as measured by the elicited
beliefs. We see that people send in an expectation of positive reciprocity,
but also out of a fear of negative reciprocity. The people who take money
tend to not trust the second mover to return a positive amount.
A Mann-Whitney test shows that the amount sent by the rst mover
in the Immigrant-Immigrant treatment is signicantly dierent from all the
others at the 5% level (p-value = 0.0468), and dierent from the Immigrant-
Native treatment at the 10% level (p-value = 0.0771). So it appears that
immigrants trust other immigrants less than they trust native-born Ameri-
cans. If we compare immigrant and native-born Americans as rst movers
facing an immigrant second mover, the native-born Americans send more
(2.38 v/s 1.14) but this dierence is not signicant; the p-value is 0.1535.
When paired with a native-born American as a second mover, the amounts
that immigrant rst-movers send are not signicantly dierent from native-
born Americans (p-value = 0.91).
For the second movers, the Mann-Whitney test shows that immigrants
send 0.794 on average; less than native-born Americans (who send 4.57
on average) regardless of treatment (p-value = 0.0035). However, there is
no signicant dierence between what immigrant second movers return to
native-born Americans and what they return to other immigrants.
All told, we can reject hypothesis H1. In fact immigrants appear, at rst
glance, to have more bridging social capital than bonding social capital.
The survey measures belonging to various types of groups, including
religious, ethnic, professional, neighborhood etc. We are therefore able to
observe those who do not belong to any groups at all, and nd that they are
signicantly more likely to take money as rst movers { the p-value is 0.02.
We test the eects of education on trusting behavior and nd that immi-
grants who take money as rst movers rather than send have, on average, 1.5
fewer years of schooling. The p-value from a Mann-Whitney test is 0.024.
For native-born Americans, the eect is even stronger { those who take
6money have 1.7 fewer years of schooling and the p-value from the Mann-
Whitney test is 0.008. So we fail to completely reject hypothesis H2.
We then look at behavior by region, religion, and immigrant status. As
indicated by gure 16, a Mann-Whitney test also shows that the amounts
sent by rst movers who attend religious services regularly and are immi-
grants is signicantly dierent (p-value = 0.016) from those who are not
immigrants. For second movers this dierence is not signicant.
From responses to the question: \On a scale of 1 to 5, do you believe that
most people can be trusted (1), or that you can't be too careful in dealing
with people (5)," we normalize the responses and construct a Z-score to
measure trust. We also create a \trusting" indicator which equals one if the
individual responds with either 1 or 2.
We nd that unlike Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000),
in our study, trust measured by the survey question is in fact a weak pre-
dictor of trusting behavior { rst movers who respond with a 1 or 2 send
more. A Mann-Whitney test is signicant at the 10% level, with a p-value
of 0.078. On the other hand, it does not predict trustworthy behavior at all,
as measured by the second mover returning a positive sum. However, the
normalized trust score is higher for second movers who return at least as
much as the rst mover sent them, with a p-value of 0.04 in a Mann-Whitney
test. This is in line with Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007), who found
that those who were trustworthy tended to be trusting but the reverse was
not necessarily true. Mann-Whitney tests and Table 7 show that the trust
levels are not signicantly dierent between rst and second movers. Also,
when we control for demographic variables, trust by itself no longer matters
except when we look exclusively at immigrants.
Tables 9 and 10 show the factors inuencing trust and trustworthiness.
We see that women and older people are less likely to trust. Interestingly,
the amount that the rst mover believes the second mover will return is
less important than the belief that the second mover will send some positive
amount. We now reject hypothesis H2 { education does not seem to make
people more trusting, though it does weakly aect trustworthiness. Second
movers with more years of schooling are more likely to return as much as the
rst mover sent them. Again, those who are trusting are more likely to return
at least as much as the rst mover sent them (Table 10, column 3). Religious
attendance makes people less likely to trust, and interestingly also reduces
trustworthiness by making people less likely to send at least as much as they
received. Figure 18 shows an interesting dichotomy between immigrants who
attend more than once a week versus immigrants who attend weekly.
Table 11 looks exclusively at immigrants. We now see the eect of the
7length of time spent as a US citizen and nd that the longer the time an
immigrant has been a US citizen, the more trustworthy they are as a sec-
ond mover. However, it does not aect their trusting behavior as a rst
mover at all. On the other hand, they denitely trust other immigrants less
than they trust native-born Americans, even though immigrants are no less
trustworthy.
Table 8 lists the percentage of people in each country agreed with the
statement \most people can be trusted" in the 2004 wave of the World
Values Survey (the 1999 wave data was used for the countries that were not
surveyed in the 2004 wave). This is also used as a dependent variable (though
all countries are not covered) and we nd that, counterintuitively, those from
less trusting countries are more trustworthy as second movers. Perhaps we
can attribute this to an element of immigrant self-selection { those who leave
a country are systematically dierent from those who remain. However,
there are strong regional eects too, with immigrants from the Middle East
and South Asia being the least trusting and trustworthy.
In each case we see that those who do not belong to any social group at
all are less trusting and slightly less trustworthy. The trust experiment is
therefore able to capture an important element of social capital.
On the other hand, the rst movers who responded that they or someone
they knew had been victims of a hate crime actually sent more (3.56 on
average) than those who did not (they sent 1.82 on average; p-value =
0.007). There was no signicant dierent for second movers. This is true
even when we look exclusively at immigrants.
5 Conclusion
Two major points jump out from all the results. The rst is that immigrants
are trusted less than native-born Americans, even (especially?) by other
immigrants, but when we control for demographic variables and the amount
sent by the rst mover, they do not appear to deserve this lack of trust.
The second is that while home country variables do not have a clear impact,
the number of years spent as a US citizen (controlling for age) appear to
make immigrants more trustworthy. We have no way of knowing if this is a
cohort eect (dierent cohorts of immigrants are systematically dierent) or
captures assimilation. Either way, the moonlighting trust game is in fact a
good measure of trust and social capital, since those with low social capital
are also not trusting in the game.
People are reciprocal, which is no surprise, but this reciprocity manifests
8itself so as to make the immigrants in the sample appear less trustworthy
than they are, since they are trusted less. This lack of trust can potentially
have far-reaching implications, hindering immigrants' ability to assimilate
rapidly.
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10Appendix A: Figures and Tables







Table 2: Immigrants by region
Item Number Percent
northern/western europe 57 27
eastern europe 10 5
south asia 12 6
east asia 28 13
south-east asia 20 9
latin america 35 17
the caribbean 9 4
north america 34 16
middle east/central asia 7 3
Total 212 100
11Table 3: Group membership
immigrant
no yes total
trade or business association 10 7 17
professional association (doctors, teachers, veterans) 41 31 72
trade union or labor union 36 18 54
neighborhood committee 19 17 36
religious or spiritual group (e.g. church, mosque, temple, etc) 89 69 158
political group or movement 12 9 21
cultural group or association (e.g. arts, music, theater, lm) 17 16 33
education group (e.g. parent-teacher association, school committee) 29 19 48
sports group 25 17 42
youth or student group 15 8 23
ngo or civic group (e.g. rotary club, red cross) 8 4 12
ethnic-based community group 1 10 11
other groups 8 6 14
none 91 94 185
Total 235 210 445
12Table 4: Amounts sent by rst mover, by treatment
Treatment
N-N I-N N-I I-I Total
-5 4 4 7 5 20
-4 0 1 0 0 1
-3 1 2 2 0 5
-2 2 3 3 8 16
-1 3 1 2 1 7
0 8 10 14 6 38
1 8 8 4 7 27
2 6 5 9 4 24
3 5 7 5 1 18
4 1 1 0 0 2
5 4 8 7 5 24
6 1 0 0 0 1
8 1 0 0 1 2
9 1 0 3 1 5
10 10 11 11 3 35
Total 55 61 67 42 225
13Table 5: Amounts sent by second mover, by treatment
Treatment
N-N I-N N-I I-I Total
-15 0 0 3 1 4
-12 0 1 0 3 4
-9 3 3 5 2 13
-6 4 4 7 3 18
-3 3 7 5 3 18
0 9 7 12 2 30
1 3 2 8 6 19
2 4 3 5 1 13
3 5 10 7 5 27
4 1 3 0 6 10
5 5 0 5 2 12
6 4 3 2 1 10
7 0 0 1 1 2
8 0 0 0 2 2
9 2 1 0 0 3
10 1 5 2 2 10
12 2 1 0 0 3
14 0 2 0 1 3
15 0 3 1 0 4
19 1 0 0 0 1
20 5 3 1 0 9
25 2 3 0 0 5
27 1 0 0 0 1
30 0 0 1 0 1
40 0 0 1 0 1
Total 55 61 66 41 223
14Figure 1: Average amount sent by rst mover, by treatment
Figure 2: Average amount sent by second mover, by treatment
15Figure 3: Proportion of rst movers who take money from the second mover,
by treatment
Figure 4: Proportion of second movers who take money from the rst mover,
by treatment
16Figure 5: Second mover responses, by amount received from rst mover and
treatment
Figure 6: Amounts sent by rst movers, by belief about second mover's
action
17Figure 7: First mover's belief about second mover's action, by amount sent
Figure 8: Proportion of rst movers who take money from the second mover,
by region
18Figure 9: Average amount sent by rst mover, by region
Figure 10: Average amount sent by immigrant rst mover, by region and
treatment
19Figure 11: Proportion of second movers who take money from the second
mover, by region
Figure 12: Average amount sent by second mover, by region
20Figure 13: Average amount sent by second mover, by region and treatment
Figure 14: Average amount sent by rst mover, by religion and immigrant
status
21Figure 15: Average amount sent by second mover, by religion and immigrant
status
22Figure 16: Average amount sent by rst mover, by religious attendance and
immigrant status
Figure 17: Average amount sent by second mover, by religious attendance
and immigrant status
23Figure 18: Proportion of second movers who return at least as much as rst
mover sent, by religious attendance and immigrant status
24Table 6: Responses to: Generally speaking, on a scale of 1 to 5, would you
say that:
Item Number Percent




you can't be too careful in dealing with people 24 5
Total 447 100
Table 7: Trust by mover group
Mover group
First movers Second movers Total
people can be trusted 7 11 18
2 72 55 127
3 89 102 191
4 46 41 87
you can't be too careful in dealing with people 9 15 24
Total 223 224 447
25Table 8:
Percent of people reported as \trusting" by country, World Values Survey
Mean

































belief about amount SM will return -0.0239 -0.0775
(0.031) (0.060)
believe SM will return positive amount 1.550*** 3.686***
(0.399) (0.848)
income in 1000s -0.0039 -0.0082
(0.004) (0.008)




religious attendance percentile -1.080** -2.321**
(0.532) (1.156)
belong to no social groups -1.211*** -2.524***
(0.368) (0.758)
western europe -0.161 -0.0955
(0.598) (1.181)
eastern europe 0.209 0.438
(0.834) (1.567)
south asia -0.119 -0.131
(0.852) (1.662)
east asia 1.742** 4.068**
(0.773) (1.662)
south east asia 0.671 1.121
(0.949) (1.703)










*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 10: Second mover regression
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Ordered Logit Logit:
SM return  FM sent
treatmentII .478 -.288 -.505
(3.309) (.700) (.770)
treatmentNI -.754 -.798 -.994
(3.210) (.642) (.714)
treatmentNN -.347 -.104 -.227
(1.326) (.340) (.475)
female .447 .117 .135
(1.082) (.284) (.358)
age -.071 -.025 -.023
(.040) (.011) (.013)
amount sent by FM 1.084 .288 .009
(.148) (.042) (.039)
amount SM believes FM sent .293 .038 .100
(.233) (.061) (.061)
SM belief > 0 -.525 .231 -.038.000
(2.061) (.540) (.595)
income in 1000s 09 -09
(.015) (.004) (.005)
years of schooling .377 .091 .131
(.212) (.057) (.073)
trusting 1.276 .451 .748
(1.178) (.314) (.447)
religious attendance percentile -.826 -.444 -1.237
(1.937) (.541) (.653)
belong to no social groups -.009 -.133 -.717
(1.176) (.309) (.386)
western europe -3.119 .113 -.069
(3.345) (.746) (.737)
eastern europe .623 .849 1.336
(4.282) (1.177) (1.619)
28south asia -7.855 -1.302 -2.121
(3.616) (.889) (1.141)
east asia -5.446 -.711 -1.327
(3.334) (.739) (.980)
south-east asia -3.644 -.635 -.642
(3.515) (.766) (.924)
latin america -5.404 -.730 -.488
(3.405) (.719) (.789)
the caribbean -2.788 .053 .201
(3.752) (.983) (1.093)
middle east -13.108 -2.959
(3.673) (.823)
Obs. 191 191 190
R2 .406
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
29Table 11: Ordered Logit: Immigrants Only
(1) (2) (3)
FM amt SM amt SM return  FM sent
treatmentII -2.344 0.189 -.339
(0.875) (0.598) (0.909)
female -.678 -.588 0.106
(0.885) (0.591) (0.821)
age -.070 -.135 -.207
(0.022) (0.044) (0.061)
FM's belief about SM -.096
(0.035)
FM's belief > 0 0.556
(0.966)
FM's belief > 0 x FM's belief 0.72
(0.232)
amount sent by FM 0.251 0.117
(0.103)
SM's belief > 0 0.529 -2.025
(1.126) (2.125)
SM's belief about FM -.009 0.246
(0.145) (0.18)
income in 1000s -.002 0.00003 0.004
(0.01) (0.007) (0.012)
years of schooling -.124 0.191 0.565
(0.13) (0.127) (0.32)
trusting 0.366 1.850 2.700
(0.947)3 (3)3
religious attendance percentile -6.092 -.465 -1.200
(1.562) (1.489) (1.349)
belong to no social groups -4.147 -.888 -1.563
(1.152) (0.735) (1.070)
% trusting in home country 1.057 -4.805 -10.483
(3.716) (2.550) (4.213)
# years as US citizen 0.007 0.105 0.178
(0.026) (0.035) (0.057)
Obs. 49 45 45
30Appendix B: Survey Questions
The following questions were asked, in addition to demographic, religious
and political responses already obtained by TESS:
1. Where were you born?
[select from standard list of countries using drop-down menu { stan-
dard list in HTML format is in Appendix C]
2. Where was your mother born?
[select from standard list of countries using drop-down menu]
3. Where was your father born?
[select from standard list of countries using drop-down menu]
[If respondent or either parent was not born in the USA, mark as
Immigrant. Assign region as described in Appendix C. If respondent
AND/OR both parents were born in the USA, mark as Native.]
4. Do you or any member of your household belong to any of the following
groups (please check all that you belong to):
1 Trade or Business Association
2 Professional Association (doctors, teachers, veterans)
3 Trade Union or Labor Union
4 Neighborhood committee
5 Religious or spiritual group (e.g. church, mosque, temple, infor-
mal religious group, religious study group)
6 Political group or movement
7 Cultural group or association (e.g. arts, music, theater, lm)
8 Education group (e.g. parent-teacher association, school commit-
tee)
9 Sports group
10 Youth or student group
11 NGO or civic group (e.g. Rotary Club, Red Cross)
12 Ethnic-based community group
13 Other groups
3114 None
[If respondent checks \None," skip the next three questions and go
directly to question 10.]
5. Considering the group in which you participate most actively, how




4 Do not participate in decision-making
6. Thinking about the members of this group, are most of them of the





E. Ethnic or linguistic background, race, caste, or tribe (yes/no)
F. Income level (yes/no)





8. About how many close friends do you have these days? These are
people you feel at ease with, can talk to about private matters, or call
on for help.
(enter a number)
9. There are often dierences in characteristics between people living in
the same neighborhood. For example, dierences in wealth, income,
social status, ethnic or linguistic background, race, caste, tribe, re-
ligion, or political beliefs. To what extent do any such dierences
characterize your neighborhood?
321 To a very great extent
2 To a great extent
3 Neither great nor small extent
4 To a small extent
5 To a very small extent




3 Neither safe nor unsafe
4 Moderately unsafe
5 Very unsafe
11. Have you or anyone you know personally ever been the victim of ac-
tual or threatened physical violence or harm as a result of your race,
ethnicity, gender, religious or political beliefs etc (i.e. a hate crime) in
the United States? (select all that apply)
1 Yes, I have
2 Yes, someone I know personally has
3 No, never
12. How often have you personally felt discriminated against in the United
States because of your race, ethnicity, gender, religious, or political





13. Generally speaking, on a scale of 1 to 5, would you say that most
people can be trusted (1) or that you can't be too careful in dealing
with people (5)? (select only one)
 People can be trusted
 You can't be too careful in dealing with people
3314. In general, on a scale of 1 to 5, would you say that: (select only one)
 Most people in my neighborhood are willing to help if you need
it
 One has to be alert in my neighborhood, or someone is likely to
take advantage of you
Appendix C: Experiment Consent, Instructions, and
Questions
Instructions and consent for First Mover
[If respondent is in I(FM) - I(SM) or N(FM) - N(SM) treatment:] You and
another randomly selected participant from [respondent's own region] have
both been given $10 by our research organization, which have been placed
in your accounts.
[If respondent is in I(FM) - N(SM) treatment:] You and another ran-
domly selected participant from the United States have both been given $10
by our research organization, which have been placed in your accounts.
[If respondent is in N(FM) - I(SM) treatment:] You and another ran-
domly selected participant, a rst or second-generation immigrant to the
United States, have both been given $10 by our research organization, which
have been placed in your accounts.
[Following is the same for all four treatments:] You are player 1, and the
person you have been paired with is player 2. The game proceeds in two
stages.
Stage 1: Your decision
In the rst stage, you can decrease your account by any amount from $0 to
$10, which will increase player 2's account by three times that amount. For
example, if you decrease your account by $2, player 2's account increases by
three times $2, or by $6. You will have $8 in your account, and player 2 will
have $16 in their account.
Or, you can choose to increase your account by any amount from $0 to
$5, which will decrease player 2's account by the same amount. For example,
if you increase your account by $2, player 2's account will decrease by $2.
You will have $12 in your account, and player 2 will have $8 in their account.
34Stage 2: Player 2's decision
In the second stage, after receiving the money, player 2 has two choices.
He or she can decrease their account by any amount between $0 and the
amount present in their account after your decision, which will increase your
account by that amount. For example, if player 2 decreases their account
by $2 and chooses to increase your account, your account will increase by
$2. You can keep whatever amount you receive from player 2 in addition to
any money you chose not to send. Player 2 will keep whatever remains in
their account.
Or, player 2 can decrease their account by any amount between $0 and
the amount present in their account after your decision, and decrease your
account by three times that amount. For example, if player 2 decreases
their account by $2 and chooses to decrease your account, your account will
decrease by $6. You and player 2 will both keep whatever remains in your
accounts.
What do you choose? (select only one option)


















[If respondent is in I(FM) - I(SM) or N(FM) - N(SM) treatment:] Now
we would like you to guess what the average participant from [respondent's
own region] would do as player 2, in response to your decision as player 1.
[If respondent is in I(FM) - N(SM) treatment:] Now we would like you
to guess what the average participant from the United States would do as
35player 2, in response to your decision as player 1.
[If respondent is in N(FM) - I(SM) treatment:] Now we would like you to
guess what the average rst or second-generation immigrant to the United
States would do as player 2, in response to your decision as player 1.
[Following is the same for all four treatments:]
If you guess correctly, or within $1 of the correct answer, you will get a
bonus of $5. If the dierence between your guess and the correct answer is
more than $1, you will get a bonus of 5  the absolute dierence between
your guess and the correct answer.
Select only one option:
1. Player 2 will decrease their own account by and decrease player 1's
account by three times that amount.
2. Player 2 will decrease their own account by and increase player 1's
account by the same amount.
Instructions and consent for Second Mover
[If respondent is in I(FM) - I(SM) or N(FM) - N(SM) treatment:] You and
another randomly selected participant from [respondent's own region] have
both been given $10 by our research organization, which have been placed
in your accounts.
[If respondent is in I(FM) - N(SM) treatment:] You and another ran-
domly selected participant from the United States have both been given $10
by our research organization, which have been placed in your accounts.
[If respondent is in N(FM) - I(SM) treatment:] You and another ran-
domly selected participant, a rst or second-generation immigrant to the
United States, have both been given $10 by our research organization, which
have been placed in your accounts.
[Following is the same for all four treatments:] You are player 2, and the
person you have been paired with is player 1. The game proceeds in two
stages.
Stage 1: Player 1's decision
In the rst stage, Player 1 can decrease their account by any amount from
$0 to $10, which will increase your account by three times that amount. For
example, if Player 1 decreases their account by $2, your account increases
by three times $2, or by $6. Player 1 will have $8 in their account, and you
will have $16 in your account.
36Or, Player 1 can choose to increase their account by any amount from $0
to $5, which will decrease your account by the same amount. For example,
if Player 1 increases their account by $2, your account will decrease by $2.
Player 1 will have $12 in their account, and you will have $8 in your account.
Stage 2: Your decision
In the second stage, after receiving the money, you have two choices. You can
decrease your account by any amount between $0 and the amount present in
your account after Player 1's decision, which will increase Player 1's account
by that amount. For example, if you decrease your account by $2 and choose
to increase Player 1's account, Player 1's account will increase by $2. Player
1 can keep whatever amount you receive from you in addition to any money
you chose not to send. You will keep whatever remains in your account.
Or, you can decrease your account by any amount between $0 and the
amount present in your account after Player 1's decision, and decrease Player
1's account by three times that amount. For example, if you decrease your
account by $2 and choose to decrease Player 1's account, Player 1's account
will decrease by $6. You and player 1 will both keep whatever remains in
your accounts.
Since all the individuals in this study are being surveyed at dierent
times, we will ask you what you would do after each possible decision by
player 1. You will be paid according to the actual decision made by the
individual you have been randomly matched with. You cannot make a choice
that gives either you or Player 1 a negative payo, and you cannot enter
any decimal numbers or fractions.
1. If Player 1 increases their account by $5, and reduces your account by
$5, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 5)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 5)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
2. If Player 1 increases their account by $4, and reduces your account by
$4, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 4)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
372 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 6)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
3. If Player 1 increases their account by $3, and reduces your account by
$3, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 4)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 7)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
4. If Player 1 increases their account by $2, and reduces your account by
$2, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 4)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 8)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
5. If Player 1 increases their account by $1, and reduces your account by
$1, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 3)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 9)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
6. If Player 1 increases their account by $0, and reduces your account by
$0, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 3)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 10)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
7. If Player 1 decreases their account by $1, and increases your account
by $3, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 3)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
382 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 13)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
8. If Player 1 decreases their account by $2, and increases your account
by $6, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 2)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 16)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
9. If Player 1 decreases their account by $3, and increases your account
by $9, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 2)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 19)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
10. If Player 1 decreases their account by $4, and increases your account
by $12, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 2)
and decrease player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 22)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
11. If Player 1 decreases their account by $5, and increases your account
by $15, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter either 0 or 1) and decrease
player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 25)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
12. If Player 1 decreases their account by $6, and increases your account
by $18, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter either 0 or 1) and decrease
player 1's account by three times that amount.
392 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 28)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
13. If Player 1 decreases their account by $7, and increases your account
by $21, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Decrease my account by (enter either 0 or 1) and decrease
player 1's account by three times that amount.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 31)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
14. If Player 1 decreases their account by $8, and increases your account
by $24, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Do nothing, leave the accounts as they are now.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 34)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
15. If Player 1 decreases their account by $9, and increases your account
by $27, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Do nothing, leave the accounts as they are now.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 37)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
16. If Player 1 decreases their account by $10, and increases your account
by $30, what do you choose? (select only one option)
1 Do nothing, leave the accounts as they are now.
2 Decrease my account by (enter a number between 0 and 40)
and increase player 1's account by the same amount.
[If respondent is in I(FM) - I(SM) or N(FM) - N(SM) treatment:] Now
we would like you to guess what the average participant from [respondent's
own region] would do as player 1.
[If respondent is in I(FM) - N(SM) treatment:] Now we would like you to
guess what the average rst or second-generation immigrant to the United
States would do as player 2, in response to your decision as player 1.
[If respondent is in N(FM) - I(SM) treatment:] Now we would like you
to guess what the average participant from the United States would do as
player 1.
40[Following is the same for all four treatments:]
If you guess correctly, or within $1 of the correct answer, you will get a
bonus of $5. If the dierence between your guess and the correct answer is
more than $1, you will get a bonus of 5  the absolute dierence between
your guess and the correct answer.
Select only one option:
Player 1's account Player 2's account
At the start: 10 10
1 +5 -5
2 +4 -4
3 +3 -3
4 +2 -2
5 +1 -1
6 +0 -0
7 -1 +3
8 -2 +6
9 -3 +9
10 -4 +12
11 -5 +15
12 -6 +18
13 -7 +21
14 -8 +24
15 -9 +27
16 -10 +30
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